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REVIEWS 
The Review Section of E&A consists of three parts. The first is made up of 
brief reviews of books and articles (and perhaps films, etc.) that are concerned 
in some way with the rights and wrongs of human treatment of non-human ani-
mals. The second part' of this Section is entitled 'Replies' and contains comments 
on or responses to reviews published in earlier issues of E&A. By letter the 
Editor invites the authors of works reviewed to respond, and by this proclama-
tion in each issue invites all other interested readers to submit comments. The 
third part of the Reviews Section is a list of works of which reviews are invited. 
Any member who wishes to review any work in this continuing 'Reviews Needed' 
list should contact the Editor. 
Bryan G.· Norton, "Environmental Ethics and Weak 
Anth ropocentrism," Environmental Ethics, 
Vol. 6, No.2 (Summer 1984), pp. 131-148 
Anthropocentrism is usually under-
stood to be the view that on Iy h uma n 
beings or human conscious states 
(such as happiness or pleasure) are 
intrinsically good. The nonhuman 
world, including nonhuman animals, 
has only instrumental value as a 
means of producing human good. 
This view is almost universally 
rejected by those writing on environ-
mental ethics and animal liberation, or 
at least by those tryi ng to fi nd an 
acceptable environmental ethic and by 
those defending animal rights. For 
example, Aldo Leopold and his follow-
ers hold that anth ropocentrism is 
unacceptable as a basis for an envi-
ronmental ethic, that is, an ethic that 
can be used to justify preserving the 
environment, because it inevitably 
leads to the exploitation of natu re, to 
using nature as a mere means of sat-
isfying trivial human desires. 
Anth ropocentrism is also rejected by 
Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and others 
in the animal liberation movement. 
They usually argue that it is simply 
an unwarranted bias or prejudice, 
analogous to racism or sexism, that 
cannot be rationally defended. It is 
objectionable because it results in 
animal exploitation and suffering since 
it allows animals to be used as a mere 
means of producing human satisfac-
tion, as meat to be eaten or things 'to 
be experimented on. 
Despite this general consensus on 
the unacceptability of anthropocen-
trism, Bryan Norton tries to defend 
it, or at least a version of it which he 
calls "weak anthropocentrism." He 
wants to show that we do not need to 
embrace nonanthropocentrism in order 
to formu late a satisfactory envi ron-
mental ethic; instead we can use weak 
anth ropocentrism. 
Norton begins by distinguishing 
between two different forms of 
anthropocentrism. The first form is 
called "strong anthropocentrism" and 
it is similar to the sort of anthropo-
centi sm that is often rejected. As 
Norton defines it, "a value theory is 
strongly anthropocentric if a II va Iue 
countenanced by it is explained by 
reference to satisfactions of felt pref-
erences of human individuals. " 
(p.134) A felt preference is any 
desire or need of a human individual. 
But the satisfaction of all of these 
desires will result in harm to the 
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environment; the desire for more and 
more consumer' goods will lead to 
increased production wh ich in tu rn 
wi II cause poll ution of the ai rand 
water and the producti·on of toxic 
wastes. Not only does strong anthro-
pocentrism give us no way of criticiz-
ing those who exploit nature and ruin 
the environment, it also seems to sup-
port the exploiters and polluters, 
provided they are satisfying strongly 
felt preferences of of many human 
individuals. It should be clear 
enough, then, that strong anth ropo-
centrism is unsatisfactory as an envi-
ronmental ethic. 
Norton agrees that strong anthro-
pocentrism is unacceptable, but he 
thinks that there is a second form of 
anthropocentrism, "weak anthropocen-
trism" as he calls it, that avoids the 
difficu Ities of the fi rst form. As he 
formulates it, "a value theory is 
weakly anthropocentric if all val ue 
countenanced by it is explained by 
reference to satisfaction of some felt 
preference of a human individual or 
by reference to its bearing upon the 
ideals which exist as elements in a 
world view essential to determinations 
of considered preferences." (p. 134) 
It is considered preferences that dis-
tinguish weak anthropocentrism from 
the strong version. A "considered 
preference," as Norton defines it, is a 
desire or need consistent with a 
"rationally adopted world view-a world 
view which includes fully supported 
scientific theories and a metaphysical 
framework interpreting these theories 
as well as a set of rationally sup-
ported aesthetic and moral ideals. '.1 
(p. 134) 
But why is weak anthropocentrism 
more acceptable than the strong form? 
Norton gives two reasons. First, 
there are world views which emphasize 
the close relationship between the 
human species and other species and 
the envi ronment, and these world 
views can be used as a basis for 
criticizing preferences that merely 
exploit nature and animals. Second, 
these world views can appeal to the 
value of experiences of natural objec-
tion in human value formation. That 
is, in so far as values are formed and 
informed by contact with nature and 
other species, they take on value as 
teachers of human values. 
Now what world views does l\Jorton 
have in mind? At one point, he men-
tions Hen ry David Thoreau. No doubt 
Thoreau thought that we can learn 
from nature, but it is not clear that 
he thought of nature as having only 
instrumental value. In passages 
where he personifies Nature, it 
sounds like Nature has an intrinsic 
value independent of human con-
sciousness. So Thoreau's views are 
not clearly anthropocentric. Besides, 
Thoreau's writings obviously do not 
constitute a full-fledged world view 
complete with scientific theories, 
metaphysical framework, and rationally 
supported aesthetic and moral ideals. 
The only examples of genuine world 
views that Norton discusses are Hin-
duism and Jainism. Both of these 
religions explicitly teach nonharming: 
we should not kill other nonhuman 
creatures such as cows or even 
insects, and we should not harm the 
natu ral envi ronment either. 
But are these two religions really 
anth ropocentric in the sense of 
ascribing intrinsic value only to 
humans and their experiences? Nor-
ton assumes that they are. Thus he 
says t hat in p ros c rib ing the kill ing of 
insects and other nonhuman creatures, 
the Hindus and Jains "show concern 
for their own spiritual development 
rather than for the actual lives of 
those insects." (p. 136) But this is a 
misunderstanding of Hinduism and Jai-
nism, as a brief consideration of their 
metaphysica\ views shows. According 
to Jainist metaphysics, the locus of all 
value is not human beings, but souls 
77 
(jivas) which are eternal, blissful, 
and omniscient. These souls are not 
found only in human beings, but also 
in the bodies of animals and plants. 
All of these souls have the same 
properties and the same moral status; 
there is no important difference 
between the souls found in humans 
and those found in nonhuman crea-
tures and living things. The reason 
for not killing an animal, then, is that 
it is an "ensouled" person just like a 
human being. This is about as far 
away from standard anthropocentrism 
as you can get! 
(For a good discussion of Jainism, 
seePadmanabh S. Jaini, The Jaina 
Path of Purification, (Berkeley: Un i-
versity of California Press, 1979).) 
In Hinduism, the locus of value is 
again the soul, but this soul or Atman 
(according to the Upanishads) is 
identical with the all-pervasive, ulti-
mate reality called the Brahman. Ani-
mals have the same moral status as 
humans because they have souls too, 
and that is the main reason why it is 
wrong to kill them and eat them. In 
fact, in so far as everythi'ng partici-
pates in Brahman, everything is 
"en sou led" and shou Id he treated with 
respect. Surely this is not anthropo-
centrism as it is usually understood. 
Certainly it is not the sort of anthro-
pocentrism that one finds in Chris-
tianity where only humans have 
immortal souls and animals do not. 
Norton's so-called "weak anthropo-
centrism," then, turns out to rely 
heavily on nonanthropocentric world 
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views like Hinduism and Jainism. As 
such, it presents no threat at all to 
advocates of nona nth ropocent rism, 
despite Norton's claims to the con-
tra ry. 
Of course Norton could avoid this 
problem by appealing to clearly 
anthropocentric world views such as 
Christianity. But then he will have a 
very hard time showing that his weak 
anthropocentrism does not reduce to 
the unacceptable strong version. For 
he will no longer be able to give his 
two reasons for preferring the weak 
over the strong form. Unlike Hindu-
ism and Jainism, Christianity does not 
emphasize a close relationship between 
humans and other species and the 
envi ronment. On the contra ry there 
is a radical separation. Humans have 
souls and animals and the environment 
don It, and h umanshave a God-given 
"dominion" over animals and nature. 
This implies that 
mals and nature 
poses, including 
their desires for 
and other luxury 
hardly gives us 
humans can use ani-
for their own pur-
the satisfaction of 
meat, automobiles, 
items. Christianity 
any solid basis for 
criticizing preferences that merely 
exploit nature and animals. Further-
more, Ch ristian ity does not teach us 
to form our values in contact with 
animals and nature. Rather God and 
humans are the source of all values. 
If wea k a nth ropocent ri sm appea Is to 
an anth ropocentric world view such as 
Ch ri stia n ity, then, it seems to reduce 
to strong anthropocentrism, a view 
that Norton himself agrees is unaccep-
table. 
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